Oriental Institute, Warsaw University

The International Seminar on Argument and Reason in Indian Logic, was held at Warsaw University, 20-24 June, 2001 (Wednesday-Sunday). The Seminar was one of the most important events in the field of Indian logic in 2001.

The Seminar did focus on various aspects of Indian logic and philosophy, with special emphasis on patterns on reasoning, strategies of arguing and formal proof procedure in Indian philosophy. The seminar has also become a forum for a discussion pertaining to such questions as whether the concept of syllogism can justifiably be regarded to corresponds to Indian formal proof procedures, how we can symbolise an Indian patterns of reasoning, etc. The papers delivered at the Seminar were intended to be published as a special issue of the Journal of Indian Philosophy, presently the most important journal on Indian philosophy in the community.

Yet Again on Svabhavapratibandha: Some Ontological Questions

John Dunne

This paper focuses on Dharmakirti's notion of svabhava-pratibandha, especially as presented in his Pramana-varttika-samprajna-vrtti, with some attention to parallel discussion in his other works. In an attempt to improve and clarify what I have previously discussed (1999; UMI  9936196), I focus upon the tadatmya mode, and I begin by asking why tadatmya cannot be fully explained in terms of mere ontological reduction, i.e., the ontological identity of sadhya and sadhana. Here, Dharmakirti's discussion of fruits on a branch (PVSV on PV1.18ab; Gnoli 12.14-25) will serve as our most obvious example. By inquiring into what we most supply beyond mere ontological reduction to explain the logical validity of reasoning based upon tadatmya, our discussion will next raise the crucial role that apoha plays in the formulation of svabhava in both of its senses. Examining apoha in this context will oblige us to recall the ontological presuppositions involved, and we will illustrate these presuppositions by discussing pratiniyata-sakti and samanya-sakti in relation to apoha (PVSV on PV1.137-142; Gnoli 66.14-69.8). With all this in mind, I will attempt to demonstrate how we can supplement mere ontological reduction in at least some forms of valid reasoning based upon tadatmya.


Fragments of Buddhist Logic from the Kusana Period

Eli Franco (Vienna)

The Spitzer-Manuscript (SHT-810), the earliest philosophical manuscript in Sanskrit that was recovered by the Turfan expeditions, contains a large number of fragments, mostly very small ones, that deal with the topic of debate (vada). In my paper I will attempt to arrange some of these in a meaningful order and to determine their place within the manuscript. My hypothesis is that (approximately) folios 398-416 of the original manuscript contained a section on debate that is similar to the *Upayah.rdaya (attributed to Nagarjuna).

Notation and Reason in Early Classical India

Brendan S. Gillon (Montreal)

The paper addresses the question: what are the advantages and disadvantages of using notation in setting out what philosophers in classical India had to say about reason? The paper argues that, while notation allows one to abstract the relevant form of reason studied, it risks misleading us about the nature of their enterprise. The paper argues that their enterprise was not an enterprise of logic but an enterprise of ontology, epistemology and dialectics.

The Reason for Yukti

Edeltraud Harzer (Austin, Texas)

In order to gain a better understanding of such terms as yukti, we need to explore early sastraic works. Such works, some medical, others on polity, though not at all philosophical, are still of a theoretical nature. One of the main sources for this study of yukti is the Caraka-samhita. There are also pertinent references in the Aitareya-brahmana and Susruta-samhita. Yukti was one of the four cornerstones for expounding a theoretical system. The others are what we call pramanas: verbal authority, perception and inference. Apart from this, we also find more detailed sets of features which make a given theoretical work rigorous in its analytical approach.
Here yukti acquired yet another meaning. Many of the early theoretical works shared a common ideology. This analytical and conceptual theory relied on the Samkhya teachings. There is no independent early work of Samkhya. Only centuries later during the classical period, a mnemonic text, the Samkhya-karika summarised newly systematised theories together with earlier doctrines. One of the commentaries, the Yukti-dipika, discusses the tantra-gunas, the term appears to be a synonym for tantra-yuktis. I shall discuss to what extent yukti can become a formal argument. The question is whether yukti just facilitates a further search for a better and more complete analytical method. Here yukti loosely refers to building an argument in support of a claim, or implies that a presentation of the material is arranged in a reasonably logical way. Thus yukti endorses a certain piece of writing as proper theory. In this paper I shall examine what other kinds of application yukti had as well as how diversified its purpose was. I shall also speculate on why we do not witness a similar practice in later works and therefore lack an explanation of its earlier uses.

An interpretation of Dharmakirti's svabhavahetu

Takashi IWATA (Tokyo)

One of contributions of Dharmakirti to Buddhist logic consists in his reinterpretation of Dignaga's logic by means of the ontological relation "essential connection" (svabhavapratibandha), i.e. tadatmya, the relation that the sadhana (proving factor) is the self of the sadhya (factor to be proved), and tadutpatti, the relation that the sadhana is the effect of the sadhya. On the ground of this essential connection, he restricts all valid reasons basically to two kinds: svabhavahetu and karyahetu. The validity of the logical relation between the svabhavahetu and its consequence, a property to be proved (sadhyadharma), is based on the ontological relation of tadatmya, while that of the logical relation between karyahetu and aproperty to be proved is based on the ontological relation of tadutpatti.
In spite of the important role of the svabhavapratibandha to guarantee the validity of inferential relation in the sphere of real things, in the case of the svabhavahetu the dynamic interpretation of tadatmya is not clearly given. Namely, in contrast to the well known relation of cause and effect, which is the basis for the establishment of the inferential relation between karyahetu and its consequence, the relation of tadatmya, probably because of its static feature, does not seem to be self-evident when the question arises as to how it appears concretely in the sphere of real things. The present paper aims to illustrate the dynamic feature of the tadatmya from the aspect of the causal relation of real things and their own material causes.
Although Dharmakirti's interpretation of inferential relation by means of the minimal principle of the svabhavapratibandha is systematically so simplified that it makes us possible to grasp the general scheme of his logic, just because of this very simplicity the validity of his logical system is called into question: how is it possible to interpret arbitrary valid reasons only on the basis of either tadatmya or tadutpatti; in other words, how are valid reasons reduced to either svabhavahetu or karyahetu?
I have treated some of these problems elsewhere. Among the problems arising in connection with the validity of the svabhavapratibandha, those with respect to the tadutpatti are relatively easy to solve, because the transformation of causality into this logical relation is widely known: there is no effect without cause, namely, whenever there is an effect, there is a cause. To the contrary, in the case of the interpretation of svabhavahetu on the basis of the tadatmya one encounters a problem of how to establish the logical pervasion of the svabhavahetu by its consequence, but not the contrary pervasion of the consequence by the svabhavahetu, because the ontological relation of tadatmya implies the factual identity of sadhana and sadhya, and hence the transformation of the ontological relation of tadatmya to the logical relation is not so clear as in the case of the causality. The present paper deals with the problem whether the difference between the two types of the svabhavahetu, namely, the second and the eighth type of reason in Dignaga's Hetucakra, can be explained by the tadatmya; if not, what conditions are to be presupposed.

The Mimamsa Definition of Pramana as a Source of New Information

Kei Kataoka (Tokyo)

Katsura [1984], discussing Dharmakirti's theory of truth, contrasts two points of view as relevant for Dharmakirti's criteria of pramana, namely, "pragmatic" and "epistemological" ones. As for the former "pragmatic" point of view, besides Dharmakirti's first definition pramanam avisamvadi jnanam, he comments on the second definition ajnatartha-prakaso va as follows:
"Furthermore, according to Dharmakirti, the object of pramana should be something new. This idea is probably derived from a sort of common sense belief that knowledge is meaningless unless it contains some new information. ... The definition of pramana so far discussed can be called 'the pragmatic criterion of pramana' of Dharmakirti." (Katsura [1984:224])
Besides "epistemological" correspondence with an object, being a source of new information is an important characteristic of pramana, not only for Dharmakirti, but also for Kumarila, a contemporary Mimamsaka, probably a bit senior to Dharmakirti as Frauwallner suggests. In fact this has been so in the Mimamsa tradition even before Kumarila, while in the Buddhist tradition this aspect is not found before Dharmakirti.
It is therefore necessary to reconsider what the origin of this idea may have been, and to examine whether Dharmakirti may have borrowed it from the Mimamsa. This paper will attempt to shed light on these questions mainly by examining the historical and theoretical development of the idea within the Mimamsa tradition.

Katsura, Shoryu [1984] "Dharmakirti's Theory of Truth." Journal of Indian Philosophy 12 (1984) 215-235.

Vasubandhu's Proofs in the Abhidharmakosa

Shoryu Katsura (Hiroshima)

The aim of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu's doctrinal proofs found in the Abhidharmakosa. I shall try to place and evaluate Vasubandhu's logical arguments in the history of Indian logic. I shall discuss two sets of proofs; namely, a proof of 'All exists' (sarvastivada) and that of 'Momentariness' (ksanabhagga). In the former, Vasubandhu presents the proof from the Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika standpoint. First he refers to two passages from the Buddhist scriptures which seem to indicate that the Buddha accepted the reality of the past and the future dharmas. Then he gives a certain logical reasoning in order to prove the reality of those dharmas. In short, Vasubandhu at least in this context tries to make his point by referring to agama (scripture) as well as resorting to yukti (reasoning). Vasubandhu's reasoning consists of anvaya and vyatireka; namely, when there is an object, there is a cognition, and when there is no object, there is no cognition. From this the Vaibhasikas assume that there is no cognition which has no objective support in reality (niralambana-vijnana). Thus one can conclude that as long as there is a cognition of either the past or the future dharmas, there exist the past or the future dharmas.

Vasubandhu presents two proofs of momentariness from the Sautrantika standpoint. The first proof corresponds to what is known as vinasitvanumana by the later Buddhist logicians. Cessation (vinasa), being absence, cannot expect any cause; hence, it is the essential nature of dharmas; consequently, all conditioned (samskrta) dharmas are subject to momentary cessation. The second proof is a kind of prasagga argument which supplements the first proof. If we assume that cessation expects some cause, such as a hammer, then all conditioned dharmas cease to exist due to some cause; but there are well-acknowledged momentary beings, such as a cognition, sound, and a flame; therefore, the first assumption is not true and cessation does not expect any extraneous cause. From a purely logical point of view, Vasubandhu's second proof has some problem. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that he too has to rely on prasagga argument in order to prove the thesis like 'Universal Momentariness'.

Still more on anupalabdhi-hetu - resolved issues and open questions
pertaining to Dharmakirti's third logical reason

Birgit Kellner (Vienna)

This paper, which has the character of a survey over my ongoing research on anupalabdhi, aims to draw attention to certain salient features of Buddhist logicians' exposition of the third logical reason in Dharmakirti's system.
These 'salient features' can be broadly classified into two types:
a) Historically uncontroversial, but otherwise unclear features: These are features regarding which no, or no significant, disagreement exists within the Buddhist logical tradition, but for which no, or no satisfactory, scholarly interpretation has been produced so far. Such features are, amongst others, the subsumption of non-cognition under the reason of essential property (svabhava-hetu) because of its reliance on identity (tadatmya) as an inferential relation, the claim that non-cognition does not establish absence (abhava) per se, but the conceptual, linguistic, and physical treatment of an object as absent (abhava-vyavahara), the discussion about a proper example (drstanta) in inferences based on non-cognition, and the distinction between numerous sub-types of non-cognition.

b) Historically controversial features: These are features regarding which there exists disagreement within the Buddhist logical tradition, even though the scope and implications of such disagreement remains often unclear. Such features are, amongst others, the discussion about whether negative cognition is always the result of an inferential process or whether it cannot in some cases also be the result of perception, or the discussion about whether inferences based on non-cognition are universally restricted to cases where both the subject of the inference and the negatum are objects of the same type of sense-perception, like for instance visual perception (i.e. the discussion about the concept eka-jnana-samsarga).

By drawing attention to these features, I aim to show on the one hand where prevalent opinions about non-cognition are to be corrected and to indicate on the other hand questions that remain to be solved through future research in this and related areas.

On the Ascertainment of Validity

Helmut Krasser

rNgog Lotsaba Blo ldan shes rab's classification of certain cognitions as cognitions where the validity is ascertained on account of that cognition itself (rang las, svatah) and of others where the validity is known due to another one (gzhan las, paratah) has been strongly opposed by Sa skya pandita. This has been shown in a recent (1992) paper by Ernst Steinkellner. Taking the controversy between the followers of these two teachers as a starting point, the paper aims at tracing back their ideas to their Indian sources.

ON THE UTILIZATION OF CAUSALITY AS A BASIS OF INFERENCE - DHARMAKIRTI'S STATEMENTS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION

Horst Lasic (Vienna)

As it is the case with all historically relevant results of creative activity, Dharmakirti's achievements in the field of logic are to a significant degree due to his masterly blending of ideas both old and new. He had the gift to not only thoroughly realize the tools of his predecessors, but also to combine those that he deemed useful with his own unique inventions. This his ability helped him create an edifice of ideas that no Indian philosopher of the next few centuries was able to neglect. Some of his procedures became standard models for his followers, and some were taken over with certain modifications even by his opponents. However, his abundant works also contain ideas that seem to have found neither response nor curiosity within the Indian logical tradition. The importance of these neglected ideas should not be underestimated by the historian of Indian philosophy, since in many cases the disregard of some ideas is as telling as the consideration of some other ideas.
This paper concentrates on those statements in which Dharmakirti for the first time elaborates on causality as a basis of inference. Special attention is devoted to methodological aspects. The results of the analysis of the passages in question are contrasted and compared with their reception on the part of subsequent generations of Indian philosophers.

A Study of liggaparamarsa: exploring into the presuppositions of the Indian Logic

Hiroshi Marui

I am going to talk on the concept of liggaparamarsa, one of the terms peculiar to Nyaya Logic. The chief text material is a passage from Jayanta's Nyayamanjari which deals with the controversy between acaryah and vyakhyatrah on the perceptual and inferential process(es).

Limitations of Theories of Pramana

Claus Oetke (Stockholm)

The paper points out a number of phenomena which are not only relevant for epistemological questions but are either explicitly mentioned or indirectly alluded to in works of the Indian philosophical or non-philosophical literature. I try to show that these phenomena have not been properly accounted for in Indian epistemological theories and suggest that the omissions indicate "social" features of philosophical practice which are detrimental to theoretical progress.

Intentionality and Conceptual Content in Late Buddhist Epistemology:
Apoha in the Ratnakirtinibandhavali

Parimal G. Patil (Atlanta, Ga.)

This paper provides an interpretation of Ratnakirti's theory of exclusion [apoha] by arguing that it is best interpreted as a theory of conceptual content; that is, as a theory of what our words and thoughts are about and what our bodily activity is directed towards. In interpreting the theory in this way, I hope to point to the relationships between Ratnakirti's theory of semantics and his epistemology.

Did Dignaga and Mallavadin know the Old Vakya-padiya-vrtti?

Ole Holten Pind

In his article 'Once again on the Authorship of the Tri-kandi-Vrtti' (Études Asiatiques XLVI/1 (1993) 53, n. 18), Ashok Aklujkar writes that 'when a prose part of the extant V as preserved in its manuscripts É is attested in the works of Dignaga and Mallavadin, we would be able to infer confidently that the V was known to them'. Since no one to the best of my knowledge has attempted to analyse the available evidence with a view to decide whether the sources permit us to draw any conclusion about Dignaga's or Mallavadin's knowledge of the old Vakya-padiya-vrtti, I have found it worth while to investigate whether it is possible to answer the question raised by Aklujkar. I shall also address the additional problem of whether a grammatical quotation in Dignaga's Pramana-samuccaya can reasonably be ascribed to Bhartrhari's Tika on the Maha-bhasya as claimed by very late grammatical sources.
The paper first addresses Mallavadin's treatment of VP I in Naya-cakra. It shows that Simhasurin's commentary makes it possible to conclude that Mallavadin incorporated parts of the old vrtti into his presentation of the purva-paksa. Unfortunately there are big gaps in this part of the vrtti, but parallels to the extant parts of it and the fact that Simhasurin does not distinguish between the author of the verses and the vrtti makes it possible to conclude with absolute certainty that the text which Mallavadin quotes is identical with the old vrtti.

Dignaga's indebtedness to the Vakya-padiya is well know. It is considerably more difficult to decide with absolute certainty whether he also knew the vrtti. However, with the availability of the Sanskrit MS of Jinendrabuddhi's Pramana-samuccaya-tika we are on safer ground for making inferences. The paper analyses those parts of the apoha chapter of PS V 44 in which Dignaga propounds his view of pratibha, which he understands as the sum total of exclusions, beginning with the exclusion at the level of the phoneme through those that take place at the level of the morpheme to those belonging to the level of the syntactical word. The analysis shows that pada d of PSV 44 has been lifted from VP I 155. Unfortunately there is a big gap in the VPV I so we are not in a position to decide whether Dignaga's explication is indebted to that part of the vrtti. It is possible, though, to show that there is a close parallel between certain statements of VPV I and Dignaga's own formulation that makes it reasonable to assume that he knew the vrtti. Especially Dignaga's use of the term utpreksa and its central position in the VPV would indicate that. The conclusion that Dignaga is likely to have known the vrtti is moreover strengthened by the fact that he quotes, in his treatment of words denoting aggregates (samudaya-sabda), VP I 154-55 followed by examples that are identical with those found in the relevant part of the vrtti. It is thus reasonable to assume that Dignaga was familiar with the VPV.

In the commentary on PS V Dignaga quotes a grammatical definition of the uses of the so-called abstract affixes (bhava-pratyaya) stating that [The bhava affix] denotes a connection when introduced after compounds, [words] ending in krt and taddhita affixes, except (anyatra) when introduced after idiomatic expressions, [words] whose form is not distinct, and [words] whose connection is invariable (rudhy-abhinna-rupavyabhicarita-sambandhebhyah). Kaundabhatta claims that this quotation actually stems from Hari-tika but that the Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas wrongly attribute it to Katyayana. The paper addresses the question of whether the quotation as such contains information that would favour the correctness of the attribution to Hari. It concludes that among the other uses mentioned in the definition only those pertaining to conventional terms and words whose connection is invariable represent views that are not known from other sources before Bhartrhari. Especially the last mentioned property of the bhava-affixes is significantly linked with Bhartrhari's metaphysics of Being (satta) and, moreover, is not known from other contemporary grammarians an philosophers. The paper therefore concludes that it is highly likely that it is to be attributed to Hari. Thus it is likely that Dignaga knew both the VPV and the Mahabhasya-tika.

Parley, Reason and Rejoinder

Ernst Prets (Vienna)

The early forms of Indian debate as represented by the section discussing the method on debating (sambhasavidhi) of the Carakasamhita and the definitions of the first book of the Nyayasutra, accepts rejoinders (jati) as valid means of dialectical refutation in disputation (jalpa) and eristic wrangles (vitanda). In the earlier Buddhist manual *Upayahrdaya (fang-pien hsin-lun), twenty of these refutations, which, according to Tucci's retranslation, are called dusana, the pointing out of flaws in the argumentation of the opponent, are defined as valid refutations of syllogistic arguments. The aim of this presentation is to shed light on the practical use of these rejoinders, as according to the first chapter of the fifth book of the Nyayasutra.

Inference, reasoning and causality in the Samkhya-karika

Ferenc Ruzsa (Budapest)

The classical exposition of the Samkhya philosophy, the Samkhya-karika, contains only scanty references to matters of logic. Its commentaries cannot really help in the details, as their positions are mutually contradictory and quite often logically too naive. The Yukti-dipika and to some extent Vacaspati Misra's Samkhya-tattva-kaumudi has important analyses, but these are more closely connected to contemporary logical debate than to the classical Samkhya position; often the terminology and even the basic categories are new.

Still it seems possible to reconstruct Isvarakrsna's conception of inference, because it is integrated in two ways into his system. First - and though it seems natural, it is a very rare phenomenon in philosophy - his reasoning generally conforms to his theory; he can do this because his "syllogism" is not too specific, it lacks unnecessary detail. Second, his theory of cognition is in harmony with his theory of the world: inference and causation have a parallel structure, because inference reproduces causal relations.

This means among other things that both of them are strongly "object-oriented": as the causal relation of sat-karya ('caused by an existent [thing]') obtains typically between things (and not e.g. events or states), so we infer from the ligga (a thing or a quality of a thing) another thing, the liggin. Inference is not a relation between sentences or propositions. As a consequence of this it appears that there are only two avayavas, members in the inferential process - the ligga or 'mark' in the place of the premiss, and the liggin or 'the thing marked' as the conclusion.)
There are three kinds of inference, of which the

A true follower of the Tathagata does not found his trust upon austerities or rituals, but believes in the giving up the idea of self and relies wholeheartedly on Amitabha , the unbounded light of truth, says Paul Carus in The Gospel of Buddha.

Two extremes should be avoided by a recluse: indulgence in sensual pleasures and addiction to self-mortification. Abandoning both these extremes the Tathagata has comprehended the Middle Path promoting sight and knowledge and tends to peace, higher wisdom, enlightenment and Nirvana.

What the Buddha spoke at Sarnath in his first sermon, the Dharmachakrapravartana or Turning of the Wheel of Law, put forth the Middle Way , the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path. The Buddha said that the way to salvation was not dependent on God or Divine Grace but on understanding the way things really are. It is essentially concerned with man, or rather with all living, suffering beings caught in the treadmill of desire and craving.

Phra Peter Pannapadipo, an English Monk in Thailand wrote: “By following Buddha’s teachings, I feel profoundly content —with my environment, my life and with everything that life throws at me, including its ending... what more could anybody want?

Buddhism is not centred on a god, rather, it is a system of philosophy and a code of morality. Moreover, the achievement of enlightenment is the goal of every being, so eventually, we will all reach Buddhahood.

In India , Buddhism evolved and spread rapidly after it was embraced by Emperor Ashoka in the 3rd century B.C. Although Buddhism spread throughout Asia it remained virtually unknown in the West until recent times. Western knowledge of Buddhism emanated through three main channels: the labour of western scholars; the work of philosophers, intellectuals, writers and artists; and the arrival of Asian immigrants who brought various forms of Buddhism with them to America and Europe . 

The reasons why the West finds Buddhism attractive are complex, and have as much to do with the cultural history of the West as with the characteristics of Buddhism. One of the most popular western interpretations of Buddhism is that it is a rational philosophy, and materialistic developments in the West have created a climate of science and secular liberation which is favourable to Buddhism.

Few Buddhist doctrines are in direct conflict with science. Recent discoveries in quantum physics suggest that science is slowly coming round to a view of reality not unlike that described in Buddhist philosophy. Works such as Frijof Capra’s The Tao of Physics have revealed interesting parallels between the conceptual worlds of theoretical physics and eastern thought.

Buddhism is undogmatic, even to the extent of instructing its followers not to accept its teachings uncritically but always to test them in the light of their own experience. Although it asks that its followers take certain basic teachings on trust in the initial stages, and adopt a positive and open-minded attitude, Buddhism is more concerned with the development of understanding than the acceptance of credal formulas. The fact that Buddhism imposes few confessional, ritual, or other requirements on its followers makes it easy to live as a Buddhist in a pluralistic milieu and this minimises the likelihood of overt conflict with secular values.

It would be inadequate to define Buddhism simply as a philosophy, a way of life or a code of ethics. It includes all these things and more: A great deal depends on the perspective of the seeker.